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On November 19, 1985, a Texas district court jury sent
shockwaves throughout the mergers and acquisitions field by
awarding Pennzoil Company (Pennzoil) 10.53 billion dollars in its
claim against Texaco, Inc. (Texaco) for tortious interference with a
contract.' Pennzoil and Getty Oil Company (Getty) had been nego-
tiating a merger of their two companies. After considerable negoti-
ations and agreement on some points, Pennzoil and Getty released
a joint press release detailing many terms of the merger. This re-
lease stated that the parties had reached an "agreement in princi-
ple" to a merger of Getty and a newly formed entity owned by
Pennzoil and the trustee of the Sarah C. Getty Trust. The press
release also stated that the transaction was subject to the execu-
tion of a definitive merger agreement.
After the press release was issued, Pennzoil and Getty began
drafting the formal merger agreement. Getty, however, then en-
tered into negotiations with Texaco, and these two companies sub-
sequently signed a merger agreement in which Texaco acquired
one hundred percent of Getty. Pennzoil brought suit against Tex-
aco for tortious interference with Pennzoil's contract to merge with
Getty even though no merger documents or formal contracts were
signed by Pennzoil and Getty.
The Pennzoil decision rests on an area of contract law that
most mergers and acquisitions specialists considered already set-
tled.2 This area commonly is called the law of "agreements in prin-
ciple with a formal contract contemplated."3 When parties enter
into negotiations and agree on terms one by one, they may expect
1. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., No. 84-05905 (151st Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex.
Nov. 15, 1985), afl'd, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The
appeals court reduced the punitive damage award from three billion to one billion dollars.
Id. at 866. The stated facts were'taken from the decision of the Texas Court of Appeals in
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). Pennzoil and Getty Trust
drafted a Memorandum of Agreement detailing the proposed merger. The Getty Oil Board
initially rejected this Memorandum by a 15 to 1 vote. The next day, the Getty Board voted
to accept Penntoil's merger proposal for a price of $110 per share with a $5 stub. The jury
found that the Getty Board at this point accepted the Memorandum and agreed to be
bound by its terms. Id. at 784. This finding is at the heart of the controversy.
2. See Cautious Talks: Texaco-Pennzoil Case Makes Firms Careful About Merger
Moves; Just What Is an Agreement Stirs Much Uncertainty; a Risk in Shaking Hands;
But the Precedent May Fade, Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1986, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Wall
Street]; DiBlasi & Cyganowski, A Guide to Handshakes, Higher Bids, N.Y.L.J., June 2,
1986, at 23, col. 6.
3. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 673, 676-77 (1969).
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to execute a formal contract later.4 The legal question that arises
is, when are the parties legally bound-before or after the signing
of a formal contract? 5 Prior to the Pennzoil decision, mergers and
acquisitions specialists believed that parties became bound only af-
ter the signing of a formal agreement.6 Pennzoil, however, demon-
strates that dangerous uncertainty surrounds the use of an agree-
ment in principle with a formal contract contemplated in a merger
or acquisition. This uncertainty over when the parties become
bound and the risk of being held liable for tortious interference
with a merger contract may lead to a decline in the number of
competing bids in tender offers.7 Congress and the Securities Ex-
change Commission (SEC) enacted the Williams Act and the rules
promulgated thereunder with the intent of facilitating competing
bids."
Pennzoil also has created a new lock-up defensive weapon that
target companies may use to discourage auctions and competitive
bidding.' In addition, the decline in the number of competing bids
caused by Pennzoil and the continued use of agreements in princi-
ple may have detrimental effects on targets' shareholders and soci-
ety in general."0 The repercussions of Pennzoil, therefore, raise a
number of issues concerning agreements in principle and justify a
search for possible solutions to avoid a decline in competitive
bidding.
This Note addresses the problems created by Pennzoil and the
use of agreements in principle in the area of mergers and acquisi-
tions. Part II discusses the relevant law on agreements in principle
formed before entering into the formal contract contemplated by
the parties. Part III analyzes in depth the problems associated
with agreements in principle in mergers and acquisitions. Finally,
Part IV suggests three possible solutions that, if adopted, could
avoid the problems discussed in Part III.
4. 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 30 (1963).
5. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 87-124 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 93-123 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of this new device, see infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
10. Commentators disagree over whether competing bids are beneficial or detrimental
to society and shareholders. Compare Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982) with Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of
a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981). See
also infra notes 129-60 and accompanying text.
1987] 1369
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II. AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE WITH A FORMAL CONTRACT
CONTEMPLATED BY THE PARTIES
A. The Problem
The parties to a contract often engage in substantial prelimi-
nary negotiations consisting of meetings, letters, or telephone con-
ferences to discuss various terms on which they differ. During this
sometimes lengthy negotiation process, the parties may agree to a
particular term and move on to the next. By the end of the negoti-
ations, the parties may have agreed on all, or substantially all, of
the terms of the contract. In many cases, the parties contemplate
the drafting and signing of a formal contract that embodies the
agreed-on terms; this raises the issue of when the parties become
bound by the contract.1 Are the parties bound upon agreement to
all of the essential terms, or are they bound only after the formal
contract has been drafted and executed? These situations often are
called "formal contract contemplated' 1 2 or "written memorial con-
templated" cases.' 3
Determining exactly when the parties to the agreement be-
come legally bound is often crucial. Until a party becomes legally
bound to an agreement, the party may decide to enter into an al-
ternative transaction of a similar nature with a third party or to
refrain from action altogether. In either case, the party is not an-
swerable to the abandoned party for disappointing expectations. 4
Once the parties become bound, however, any deviation from or
refusal to follow the terms of the agreement can result in a breach
of contract. The Pennzoil award illustrates both the importance of
determining whether a binding contract exists and the disastrous
consequences of wrongly concluding when the parties became
bound.
B. The Law before Pennzoil
In the typical "formal contract contemplated" case, the parties
clearly intend to bargain and have reached agreement on many, if
not all, of the essential contractual terms. Both parties also con-
11. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.85, at 119 (1982).
12. Knapp, supra note 3, at 676.
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 27 (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
14. Knapp, supra note 3, at 676. This rule applies unless the offeree's disappointment
was caused by substantial, foreseeable reliance, in which case the offeree may have a rem-
edy. Id. at 676 n.11.
1370 [Vol. 40:1367
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template the later execution of a formal document. 15 The parties
may not agree, however, on the extent to which they are legally
bound prior to the formal contract.16 The parties may believe that
neither is bound until the signing of the document and, therefore,
that either party may withdraw at any time regardless of what has
been agreed on already.17 On the other hand, the parties may be-
lieve that the execution of the formal document is a formality that
only memorializes the terms agreed to earlier. Under the second
scenario, the parties might expect to be contractually bound prior
to the writing.
18
The law in this area used to be relatively settled. Courts would
effect the intent of the parties by adopting either of the two views
discussed above.'9 Courts determined when a contract was formed
by looking to the intent of the parties regarding when they in-
tended to be bound.20 Even if the parties agreed to all of the essen-
tial terms of a proposed contract, unless the parties intended to be
bound prior to the execution of a formal written contract, no con-
tract existed until such execution actually occurred.2' Some courts
have held execution of a formal contract to be a condition prece-
dent to the finality of the agreement.2 2 Courts also have held that
if the parties agreed on all of the substantial terms of the contract
15. Id. at 676.
16. Id. at 682.
17. Id. Professor Knapp states that the parties probably will hold this view if the fol-
lowing factors exist:
a) the contract is of a type which requires writing for enforceability under the Statute
of Frauds; b) the contract contemplated involves large sums of money; c) the contract
has many details; d) the contract is an unusual one, for which a standard form is not
available or appropriate; e) the parties were apparently unwilling to proceed with any
performance until the formal document was prepared and signed.
Id.
18. Id. at 683. Professor Knapp lists four factors that could lead to this expectation:
a) no independent policy of the law requires a writing for enforceability, or, if it does,
the parties have exchanged letters, telegrams or other writings in which the agreed-
upon terms are sufficiently reflected; b) the proposed contract appears relatively sim-
ple, and does not involve long-term obligations; c) the contemplated "formal" contract
is a standard-form document, which itself contains the details necessary for a contract
of this sort; or d) the parties themselves, without waiting for the formality of execution,
have proceeded to perform, in a way that suggests they believed full and binding agree-
ment to have been reached.
Id.
19. Id. at 681-82.
20. 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 30, at 98-99.
21. See R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 1984).
22. See, e.g., Coulter v. Anderson, 144 Colo. 402, 410, 357 P.2d 76, 80 (1960); Bjornson
v. Five Star Mfg. Co., 61 N.W.2d 913, 915 (1953).
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with nothing left for future settlement, then an informal agree-
ment was binding as long as the parties understood that the agree-
ment was binding even without a writing.23
These rules were developed to enable parties to contract and
bind themselves as they desire.2 4 One court stated that the rele-
vant factors are the parties' expressed intentions, words, and deeds
that constitute objective signs of their intent under the circum-
stances. 25 Even though the question of intent is a factual question
to be determined by the fact-finder,26 very few courts have ad-
dressed which party bears the burden of proving that a present,
binding contract exists when no formal document has been exe-
cuted. The courts that have addressed this issue state that the bur-
den rests with the party claiming that the contract was complete
prior to the execution of a formal contract.
Despite these relatively simple rules, determining the parties'
intent in any particular case often presents a difficult question of
fact.28 The original Restatement of Contracts outlined the general
rules concerning a party's intent to be bound, 2 but gave no factors
for courts to consider in determining the question of intent.3 0 Pro-
fessor Karl Llewellyn criticized this aspect of the Restatement and
its general rules by stating that no rule can be a good rule unless
guided to the facts by some criteria. 1 The Restatement (Second)
23. See, e.g., R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d 69. The court stated the rule as follows:
Where there is no understanding that an agreement should not be binding until re-
duced to writing and formally executed, and "[w]here all the substantial terms of a
contract have been agreed on, and there is nothing left for future settlement," then an
informal agreement can be binding even though the parties contemplate memorializing
their contract in a formal document.
Id. at 74.
The Restatement states the rule similarly:
Manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract will
not be prevented from so operating by the fact that the parties also manifest an inten-
tion to prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof; but the circumstances may show
that the agreements are preliminary negotiations.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 27.
24. R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d at 74.
25. Id.
26. See ABC Trading Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 382 F. Supp. 600, 601
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); Johnston v. Johnston, 346 Pa. Super. 427, 431, 499 A.2d 1074, 1076 (1985).
27. See, e.g., Miller Constr. Co. v. Stresstek, A Div. of L. R. Yegge, Co., 108 Idaho 187,
189, 697 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).
28. 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, § 30, at 97. These decisions involve questions of fact,
not law; therefore, the diverse outcomes of the cases do not indicate a conflict in the law. Id.
29. RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTs § 26 (1932).
30. Id.
31. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, 1., 48 YALE. L.J. 1
1372 [Vol. 40:1367
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of Contracts followed Professor Llewellyn's suggestions for estab-
lishing definite criteria to aid the courts. The second Restatement
lists a number of factors to consider in determining the intent of
the parties in these cases.2 These factors include oral testimony,
correspondence, or preliminary or partially completed writings.3
The first factor concerns the extent to which the parties orally
agreed to all of the terms to be included in the expected final con-
tract.3 ' Thus, courts will decide whether there was "literally noth-
ing left to negotiate" 35 so that only the signing of the document
remained to memorialize the agreement.3 6 Courts, however, must
be careful not to characterize certain disagreements as minor or
technical.37 The actual drafting of a contract often will reveal ma-
jor areas of disagreement and other points that the parties did not
originally discuss.3 8 On these facts, the court should determine that
no disagreement exists because the parties have the right to decide
when the contract is complete and to enter into the exact contract
they desire.3 9
(1938). Professor Llewellyn writes:
Most so-called rules do indicate at least something about what facts they apply to
.... But what needs note is that until even the most precise of expressions about
legal consequence is guided to the facts which may emerge, the supposed rule can ac-
quire no meaning in life . . . . [T]here is, and has been, good and shrewd judicial dis-
cussion of useful criteria to use-persuasive too, I suggest, to any court to which it
might be quoted-because it helps.
Id. at 13-14 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original). Llewellyn then suggests the factors,
see infra note 32, discussed in Mississippi & Dominion S.S. Co. v. Swift, 86 Me. 248, 29 A.
1063 (1894). Llewellyn, supra, at 14 n.29.
32. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 27 comment c. These eight factors are:
[1] [TJhe extent to which express agreement has been reached on all the terms to be
included, [2] whether the contract is of a type usually put in writing, [3] whether it
needs a formal writing for its full expression, [4] whether it has few or many details, [5]
whether the amount involved is large or small, [6] whether it is a common or unusual
contract, [7] whether a standard form of contract is widely used in similar transactions,
and [8] whether either party takes any action in preparation for performance during
the negotiations.
Id.
33. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 27 comment c.
34. Id.; see also R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 76 (2d Cir. 1984)
(stating that the question "is whether there was literally nothing left to negotiate or settle,
so that all that remained to be done was to sign what had already been fully agreed to").
35. R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d at 76.
36. Id.
37. Winston v. Mediafare Entertainment Corp., 777 F.2d 78, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1985)
(stating that courts must be careful not to state categorically that the parties have agreed on
all major issues and that no further drafting remains to be completed).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 83. The court stated:
It is not for the court to determine retrospectively that at some point in the evolution
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1367
A second important factor is whether the contract is one that
parties typically put in writing.40 In this regard, courts examine us-
age and custom of trade.4' If a standard form contract is available
and widely used for a particular type of agreement, a court will be
more likely to find an intent to be bound prior to execution of a
formal document.42 The greater the complexity and importance of
the transaction, the greater the likelihood that the parties intended
that the agreement not be final prior to formal execution of a con-
tract.43 In R. G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co.,44 for example,
the Second Circuit examined the negotiations between Bojangles'
of America, Inc. and the hopeful purchaser of a Bojangles'
franchise. The Bojangles' franchise agreement included a twenty-
year term and provided for such matters as trade secrets, purchase
and development of real estate, rights on termination and default,
and construction of restaurants.45 One basis for the court's holding
that the parties did not intend to be bound by an oral understand-
ing was that agreements of this complexity are usually put in
writing.
46
Another important factor is whether the contract requires a
formal execution for its full expression.47 Again, the focus is on the
of a formal document that the changes being discussed became so "minor" or "techni-
cal" that the contract was binding despite the parties' unwillingness to have it executed
and delivered. For the court to do so would deprive the parties of their right to enter
into only the exact contract they desired.
Id.
40. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 27 comment c; see also R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d
at 69 (2d Cir. 1984); ABC Trading Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 382 F. Supp. 600,
603 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
41. See 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, at 105.
42. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 27 comment c; see also Knapp, supra note 3, at
682.
43. 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 4, at 105-06.
44. 751 F.2d 69 (2d. Cir. 1984).
45. Id. at 77. The court stated that the most telling fact was an initial investment of
over $2 million and alleged losses of $80 million. Id.
46. Id.; see also ABC Trading Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 382 F. Supp. 600
(E.D.N.Y. 1974). In ABC Trading Co. the district court decided whether an oral settlement
agreement following a breach of contract for the shipping of wire and cable products from
defendant to plaintiff was binding absent a formally executed written agreement. In finding
the oral agreement not binding, the court examined the complexity and importance of the
transaction. Id. at 603. The court stated that "while it is true that many settlement agree-
ments are in fact concluded orally, a situation made possible by their relatively uncompli-
cated nature, i.e., a sum of money is exchanged for a release, the involved nature of the
instant settlement forecloses such an approach." Id.
47. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 27 comment c; see also Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM
Corp., 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1984); Miller Constr. Co. v. Stresstek, A Div. of L.R. Yegge, Co.,
108 Idaho 187, 189, 697 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).
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complexity of the agreement.48 A court would determine whether a
practical business need, such as the magnitude and complexity of
the deal, exists to record the parties' commitments in formal docu-
ments." If the court finds a business reason favoring a formal con-
tract, then the parties probably did not intend to be bound absent
such a writing.
Courts often consider whether the contract has few or many
details.50 In Hill v. McGregor Manufacturing Corp.,51 for example,
the parties signed a one-page "Memorandum of Understanding"
settling complicated suits involving manufacturing rights and pat-
ents. The court noted that the parties failed to address many es-
sential issues. The memorandum was so cursory in its treatment of
certain important matters that the court held the parties never in-
tended the document to be an enforceable agreement.2
Courts also examine the dollar amount involved in the agree-
ment.5 3 The court in Miller Construction Co. v. Stresstek, a Divi-
sion of L.R. Yegge Co.,54 for example, stated that the dollar
amount was certainly relevant. 5 This criterion, however, is highly
subjective and depends on the facts of each particular case.
Yet another factor courts examine to determine intent is
whether the parties have begun performance in any way.56 One
party may have partially performed his duties under the agree-
ment, and the other party may have accepted this performance.
Even if the other party disclaims the contract, the actions of both
parties demonstrate unmistakably that they intended to form a le-
48. Reprosystem, 727 F.2d at 262-63.
49. Id.
50. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 27 comment c; see also Upsal St. Realty Co. v.
Rubin, 326 Pa. 327, 192 A. 481 (1937) (holding that a preliminary agreement labeled "Appli-
cation for Lease" was clearly incomplete); Plumbing Shop, Inc. v. Pitts, 67 Wash. 2d 514,
520, 408 P.2d 382, 385 (1965) (noting that "it cannot be said that all the terms of the agree-
ment were settled. . . [and the parties] must have intended to set out those particulars...
in the written contract"); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, § 3.8, at 120-21.
51. 23 Mich. App. 342, 178 N.W.2d 553 (1970).
52. Id. at 345, 178 N.W.2d at 555.
53. RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 27 comment c; see also Miller Constr. Co. v. Stress-
tek, A Div. of L.R. Yegge, Co., 108 Idaho 187, 697 P.2d 1201 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).
54. 108 Idaho 187, 697 P.2d 1201 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).
55. Id. at 189, 697 P.2d at 1203; see also R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751
F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984). The parties in R.G. Group, Inc. had an investment of $2 million
and alleged losses of $80 million. The court stated that "[wjith that amount of money at
stake, a requirement that the agreement be in writing and signed simply cannot be a sur-
prise to anyone." Id.





Courts almost always consider one final indicator of the par-
ties' intent-whether the parties made any explicit statements that
they reserve the right to be bound only after signing a formal doc-
ument.58 Courts differ on how much weight to give such state-
ments. That the parties considered the signing of a formal docu-
ment constitutes some, but not conclusive, evidence that the
parties did not intend to be bound until the execution of the docu-
ment.5 9 Some courts have held this circumstance to be "strong evi-
dence" that the parties did not intend the negotiations to consti-
tute an agreement prior to the execution of the formal writing.60
Other courts have given this factor "considerable weight" and are
reluctant to discount such a clear signal, regardless of whether the
parties reserve the right to be bound during the course of bargain-
ing or at the time of the alleged agreement."1 Thus, the parties'
contemplation of a written document is convincing evidence of
their intent not to be bound prior to the document's execution.2
Courts employ some or all of these factors to determine
whether the parties intended to be bound prior to the execution of
a binding, formal instrument. In many cases, however, the factors
do not point to a single conclusion. Viewed retrospectively, this so-
lution to the problem of determining the intent of the parties when
they reach an agreement in principle with a "formal contract con-
57. R.G. Group, Inc., 751 F.2d at 75-76. The court noted that when one party has
partially performed and the other has accepted this performance, it "is an unmistakable
signal that one party believes there is a contract; and the party who accepts performance
signals, by that act, that it also understands a contract to be in effect." Id.
58. See, e.g., id. at 75; Miller Constr. Co., 108 Idaho at 189, 697 P.2d at 1203.
59. Universal Prods. Co. v. Emerson, 36 Del. 553, 570, 179 A. 387, 394 (1935) (noting
that whenever "the evidence discloses that in the negotiations between the parties, the exe-
cution of a formal written contract is contemplated, that is some evidence that any prior
oral, or other informal agreement by correspondence, is merely tentative, and not final");
see also Priest v. Oehler, 328 Mo. 590, 600, 41 S.W.2d 783, 787 (1931) (stating that the
parties' contemplation of a formal contract "is a matter to be taken into account in constru-
ing the evidence and determining whether the parties have really come to a final agreement
or not").
60. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Happy Hour Amusement Co., 177 A.D. 232, 163 N.Y.S. 715
(1917). Several cases stating this proposition are discussed in Annotation, Formal or Writ-
ten Instrument as Essential to Contemplated Contract Where the Making of Such Instru-
ment Is Contemplated by Parties to Verbal or Informal Agreement, 122 A.L.R. 1217, 1249
n.47 (1939).
61. See, e.g., R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1984).
62. But see Rankin v. Mitchem, 141 N.C. 277, 53 S.E. 854 (1906) (holding that reser-




templated" can be difficult, doubtful, and unsatisfactory.0 3
III. EFFECTS OF "FORMAL CONTRACTS CONTEMPLATED" IN
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
A. The Importance of the Law on Mergers and Acquisitions
The use of agreements in principle with a "formal contract
contemplated" can lead to costly litigation over the factual issue of
the parties' intent to be bound prior to the execution of the formal
contract. The use of the "formal contract contemplated" merits
discussion particularly in the area of corporate mergers and acqui-
sitions. Because of the various intricacies, sums of money, negotia-
tions, and government regulations that characterize the typical
merger or acquisition, these transactions seem particularly ill-
suited for a concept of contract law that leaves room for factual
manipulation and surprise.6 4 In spite of these difficulties, many, if
not most, parties in complicated mergers employ agreements in
principle with a "formal contract contemplated" at some point
during the course of their dealings. 5
The general scenario for a traditional single-step merger be-
gins with a period of preliminary negotiations during which the
parties attempt to agree on a mutually satisfactory price. 6 During
these preliminary negotiations, the parties normally do not deal in
terms of final binding agreements. 7 Once the parties arrive at a
meeting of the minds on the transaction, they have reached an
"agreement in principle." At this stage in the negotiations, the par-
ties usually have an oral agreement or a written memorandum of
understanding. The parties often make this memorandum or oral
agreement subject to further negotiation and execution of a defini-
63. See Mississippi & Dominion S.S. Co. v. Swift, 86 Me. 248, 259, 29 A. 1063, 1067
(1894). As Professor Llewellyn wrote:
[11n all of Offer and Acceptance, few "rules" or situations can possibly be as practically
important to the student whom scholars teach as this one. This is one of the few in
which the future lawyer may hope to get a chance to shape the facts, not merely to
argue over the picked bones of their prior slaughter.
Llewellyn, supra note 31, at 14 n.29 (emphasis in original).
64. See, e.g., Freund & Easton, The Three-Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1679, 1687-90 (1979). The governmental
regulation arises from the Williams Act. See infra notes 91-123 and accompanying text.
65. Freund & Easton, supra note 64, at 1687-88. In the traditional single-step merger,
the parties negotiate until they agree on certain issues, at which point they have an agree-
ment in principle. Id.
66. Id. at 1687.
67. Id.
19871 1377
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tive merger agreement. Generally, the parties then issue a joint
press release stating that they have reached an agreement in prin-
ciple subject to the execution of a formal, signed merger agree-
ment. Until Pennzoil, specialists in the securities field observed
that such a release provides notice to any other corporation wish-
ing to enter the bidding war that the target is for sale and that the
parties are not yet contractually bound.6 8
When the parties reach an agreement in principle subject to
the execution of a definitive merger document, the long period of
final negotiation begins.6 9 During this time, the buyer will further
investigate the target's financial, structural, and managerial condi-
tions. The parties also prepare proxy statements containing de-
tailed information to submit to shareholders in anticipation of a
shareholder vote on the proposed merger. Finally, the parties at-
tempt to negotiate a definitive merger agreement detailing the pre-
liminary agreements and any further matters that may have
arisen.7 0 After the parties sign the merger agreement, file the proxy
materials with the SEC, and the target company's shareholders ap-
prove the merger, the merger is complete. 1
According to several commentators, agreements in principle
have no effect until the signing and approval of a definitive merger
agreement.7 2 Given the existing law on agreements in principle
with a "formal contract contemplated, 7 3 these commentators ap-
68. Id. at 1688. Freund and Easton, both members of the New York bar, describe the
effects of such a press release:
[T]he world is put on notice that the target is up for sale at a time when the parties are
not contractually obligated to each other. There is nothing to stop any other company
interested in acquiring the target from entering the fray .... If the target is an at-
tractive one, "grey knights"--dripping with cash or proffering attractive securi-
ties-can be expected to enter the picture.
Id. at 1688, 1689 (emphasis in original). Thus, Freund and Easton apparently believe that
the parties are not bound prior to the signing. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
69. Freund & Easton, supra note 64, at 1688.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1690. Mergers of this type generally will take at least three to four months to
complete. Id.
72. See, e.g., id. at 1688. See also I BUSINESS AcQuIsITIoNs (J. Herz & C. Baller 2d ed.
1981), in which the editors state that a properly drafted letter of intent must reflect clearly
that the parties do not consider the letter a legally binding document. The parties should
provide that the letter "is merely a memorandum confirming the understanding of the par-
ties, is subject to the preparation and execution of a definitive contract, and is not to be
construed as legally binding on either party." Id. § 4.103. The editors further state that "a
properly drafted letter of intent has no binding effect. [A disclaimer like the one above]
operates to nullify any obligations, implicit or explicit, derived from the text of the letter."
Id. § 4.104 (emphasis added).
73. See supra notes 19-63 and accompanying text.
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pear at first glance to be correct. In Pennzoil many of the factorsU
that courts use to determine intent should have indicated that the
parties did not intend to be bound prior to the signing of a formal
document. The court in Pennzoil applied New York law, which re-
gards four factors to be important in determining the intent of the
parties: (1) whether the parties have expressly reserved the right
not to be bound prior to execution of a formal document; (2)
whether either or both parties have partially performed the con-
tract; (3) whether the parties have agreed upon all of the terms of
the agreement; and (4) whether the agreement is of a type usually
put in writing.
75
The first of these criteria arguably was satisfied when the
Pennzoil parties issued a joint press release stating that the parties
had reached an agreement in principle subject to the execution of a
definitive merger agreement.76 The parties apparently did not en-
gage in partial performance of the agreement;77 therefore, the sec-
ond listed factor for a non-binding agreement in principle also had
been met. Regarding the third factor, many points, including the
manner and time of payment and the payment of dividends,7 8 ap-
74. See supra notes 32-63 and accompanying text.
75. R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 74-76 (2d Cir. 1984).
76. Baron & Baron, The Pennzoil-Texaco Dispute: An Independent Analysis, 38 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 253, 255 (1986). The Texas Court of Appeals rejected Texaco's argument that
the language of the press release demonstrated an express reservation of the right to be
bound. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 789-90 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The court held
that "any intent of the parties not to be bound before signing a formal document is not so
clearly expressed in the press release to establish, as a matter of law, that there was no
contract at the time." Id. at 790.
77. Baron & Baron, supra note 76, at 273. Pennzoil argued that it had partially per-
formed despite the shortened time period caused by Texaco's early interference. This per-
formance included arranging to have one billion dollars ready in order to fulfill the contract.
Brief for Appellee Pennzoil Co. at 192-93, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (No. 84-05905) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee]. Texaco disagreed, stat-
ing that the gathering of funds amounted only to preparatory action that Getty did not in
any way accept. Reply Brief for Appellant Texaco, Inc. at 68 n.131, Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil
Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (No. 84-05905) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
The Court of Appeals found little evidence of partial performance to show that the parties
believed they were bound. Pennzoil, 729 S.W.2d at 791-92. The court stated that the ab-
sence of partial performance did not conclusively demonstrate the absence of a contract, but
was merely a circumstance "that the finder of fact could consider in reaching a decision on
whether the parties intended to be bound." Id. at 792.
78. Baron & Baron, supra note 76, at 272. Texaco argued that the parties never agreed
on (1) who would buy the Getty Museum's shares; (2) price protections; (3) timing and offer
of the sale; (4) which party would guarantee payment of the stub; and (5) whether Pennzoil
would honor Getty's employee benefit plans. Brief for Appellant, supra note 77, at 49-50.
Pennzoil, on the other hand, argued that some of these issues had been resolved, while
others were insignificant issues which neither party would have allowed to disturb the con-
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parently still needed to be finalized through further negotiation be-
tween Pennzoil and Getty. Finally, the size and complexity of the
negotiations and the sums of money involved strongly suggest that
the parties probably did not intend to be bound prior to the sign-
ing of the definitive merger agreement.79
Examination of both mergers in general and the facts leading
up to the proposed merger in Pennzoil arguably compels the con-
clusion that reasonable persons would expect not to be bound
before signing a formal document. Judge Friendly points out in his
concurrence to International Telemeter Corp. v. Teleprompter
Corp.80 that during complex business dealings parties generally re-
frain from making binding agreements until their attorneys finalize
the terms in a formal document. The parties' conduct prior to the
signing of a final contract generally is not that of offer and accept-
ance, but of negotiation.8 1 Nevertheless, the jury in Pennzoil,
rightly or wrongly, decided that although no formal contract was
signed, Pennzoil and Getty intended to be bound to a merger prior
to the signing of any definitive merger agreement. The question of
the parties' intent in these situations unarguably is one of fact for
the jury to decide. 2 On February 12, 1987, the Texas Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the jury's decision, merely decreasing the punitive
damages awarded. Both the trial court decision and the appellate
decision affirming its result vividly demonstrate the problems asso-
ciated with using "formal contract contemplated" language in the
tractual commitment. Brief for Appellee, supra note 77, at 194-202; see also Pennzoil, 729
S.W.2d at 792-95.
79. Baron & Baron, supra note 76, at 273. The court agreed that this factor supported
Texaco's position that the parties to this type of transaction normally would expect to exe-
cute a signed contract before being bound. Pennzoil, 729 S.W.2d at 795. The court, however,
also stated that the jury possessed sufficient evidence to find that the parties did intend to
be bound. Id.
80. 592 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1979).
81. Id. at 57 n.1. Judge Friendly stated:
The usual sequence of events [in complex business agreements] is not that of offer and
acceptance; on the contrary, the [parties] who originally conduct the negotiations, often
will consciously refrain from ever making a binding offer, realizing. ., that large deals
tend to be complex and that its terms have to be formulated by lawyers before it can
be permitted to become a legally enforceable transaction. . . . Once [the parties reach
agreement on the important aspects,] negotiation is turned over to the lawyers, usually
with instructions to produce a document which all participants are willing to sign.
Id. (quoting 2 R. SCHLESINGER, FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF
LEGAL SYSTEMS 1584-86 (1968)).
82. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The Texas Court of Appeals continu-
ally stated that the entire issue of intent involved a factual question for the jury and that
the court would uphold the jury's decisions as long as sufficient evidence existed to support
the jury finding. 729 S.W.2d at 791, 793, 795.
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complicated area of mergers and acquisitions.
B. Effects of Pennzoil and "Formal Contracts Contemplated"
on Mergers and Acquisitions
1. Uncertainty after Pennzoil
Investment bankers and attorneys are divided on the precise
effect that the Pennzoil decision will have on mergers and acquisi-
tions. Most observers agree, however, that Pennzoil has increased
uncertainty to some extent on the point at which parties in con-
tractual negotiations become legally bound."a Uncertainty about
the law regarding the "formal contract contemplated" restrains
competition because investors rely on their belief that rules will be
applied objectively and predictably."4 Some analysts, however, be-
lieve that the effect of the Pennzoil decision will be negligible
8 5
and consider the case an aberration that will be reconsidered on
appeal.8 6 The general consensus among experts seems to be that, at
the very least, negotiators will have to be extremely cautious about
the use of agreements in principle with a "formal contract
contemplated."
83. The Wall Street Journal, for example reported heightened uncertainty on this
issue and described the Pennzoil decision as "casting a long, cold shadow across American
business." See Wall Street, supra note 2. Michael Zaleski, a New York investment banker,
described a series of tough negotiations that culminated in an agreement in principle. He
attempted to shake hands on the deal, but the opposing attorney refused. Zaleski stated, "I
never thought a handshake was anything more than a moral commitment . . . . But now
people are afraid to make even a moral commitment for fear someone will use it against
them." Id. Mr. Jay Grogan, an attorney with the Dallas firm of Jackson, Walker, Winstead,
Cantwell & Miller, agreed: "The lesson learned is that the most general of writings can be
construed as an agreement." Id.
84. New York's Stake in the Texaco Case, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1986, at 27, col. 5.
Uncertainty restrains competition. Pennzoil creates uncertainty because "[c]orporations
make investment decisions on the understanding that accepted rules will be applied objec-
tively, consistently, predictably." Id. Because of the uncertainty generated by Pennzoil,
both the Business Council of New York State and New York Attorney General Robert
Abrams filed an amicus curiae brief with the Texas Court of Appeals. Id. Mr. Abrams stated
that the case "will have a direct impact on how business people and corporations comport
themselves while doing business in New York." Id. (quoting from Mr. Abrams' amicus cu-
riae brief).
85. Wall Street, supra note 2, at 1, col. 1. Blaine V. Fogg, an attorney with the New
York City firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, declared that "It]he impact of
Pennzoil v. Texaco on mergers and acquisitions will be negligible." Letter from Blaine V.
Fogg to Author (Jan. 6, 1987) (discussing impact of Pennzoil).
86. Wall Street, supra note 2, at 1, col. 1. Mr. Daniel J. Good, a mergers and acquisi-
tions specialist with E.F. Hutton and Co., stated: "The most sophisticated legal talent on
Wall Street are incredulous that this decision was decided on the facts." Id.
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2. Decrease in Number of Competing Bids
Another significant potential impact of the jury's decision in
Pennzoil is a decrease in the number of competing bids and auc-
tions, which could lead to two results. Even though the parties in
Pennzoil used "formal contract contemplated" language, the jury
found that a contract existed prior to the signing of a formal
merger agreement. The jury also found that Texaco tortiously in-
terfered with this contract. Thus, if parties to a merger or acquisi-
tion continue to use the ambiguous "formal contract contem-
plated" concept, fewer competing bids and auctions will take place
because of fear on the competing bidder's part of being found lia-
ble for tortious interference with a contract.8s This chilling effect
contravenes the intent of Congress and the SEC in the Williams
Act to encourage such auctions."'
A second result of the decrease in auctions and competing bids
involves the potential consequence of the impact of mergers on so-
ciety. Some commentators state that competing bids should be en-
couraged in order to maximize both shareholder wealth and social
welfare.89 Other commentators regard competing bids and auctions
as inherently bad for other corporations and society in general. 0
Thus, depending on the point of view, any decrease in auctions
resulting from the uncertainty generated by the Pennzoil case
could entail either positive or negative consequences.
a. The Williams Act and Competing Bids
Competing bids arise because of external competition for take-
over targets.91 In the typical merger, competing companies often
enter the picture and attempt to outbid the original bidder.9 2 The
Williams Act and other SEC regulations are the primary tools that
facilitate the opportunity to place successful competing bids.
Until the 1960s, corporations attempted takeovers by one of
87. See infra notes 124 -27 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 91-127 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 129-49 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
91. Freund & Green, Substance Over Form S-14: A Proposal to Reform SEC Regula-
tion of Negotiated Acquisitions, 36 Bus. LAW. 1483, 1500 (1981). Intense competition exists
among corporations for desirable targets and takeovers. Id. See generally Ehrbar, Corporate
Takeovers Are Here To Stay, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 91-100.
92. Freund & Green, supra note 91, at 1500. During 1977 the buyers paid more than
$100 million in at least 10 takeover attempts. In each of these 10 attempts at least 2 compa-
nies competed for the target. Ehrbar, supra note 91, at 91.
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two methods 93--proxy solicitations regulated under Section 14 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19349 or exchange offers of securi-
ties 5 regulated under the registration requirements of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933.98 During the 1960s, corporations began to make
extensive use of the cash tender offer, 97 which occurs when an indi-
vidual, group, or corporation offers to buy or bids on a set percent-
age of stock in the target corporation. 8
One advantage of the cash tender offer over the other two
types of takeover attempts was that cash tender offers could be
carried out in extreme secrecy.99 The bidder was not compelled to
disclose anything about itself or its motives. This secrecy meant
that target shareholders frequently lacked adequate information to
decide whether to tender their shares. 100 In 1968 Congress reme-
died this problem by enacting the Williams Act,10 which amended
93. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1976); see also H.R. REP. No.
1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2812-
13 [hereinafter Legislative History].
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982). The Securities Exchange Act regulates takeovers at-
tempted through proxy contests. Id. The SEC rules promulgated under section 78n require
the challenger to divulge to the shareholders the identity of all takeover participants, their
shareholdings, and when they acquired their interests. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-102 (1986).
The challenger must file this information with both the SEC and any national security ex-
change upon which any security of the issuer is listed and registered. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-11(c) (1986).
95. Piper, 430 U.S. at 22.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). When a company attempts to take over another company
through a stock-for-stock exchange, the company must register the offer in compliance with
the Securities Act of 1933. Registration provides the shareholder with a prospectus stating
the identity of the buyer and the plans proposed for the company and allows the share-
holder to make an informed decision. Legislative History, supra note 93, at 2812-13.
97. Piper, 430 U.S. at 22; see Legislative History, supra note 93, at 2811-12. This
proliferation of cash tender offers is analyzed in Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover
Bids, 45 HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135.
98. Legislative History, supra note 93, at 2811.
99. Both the proxy contest and the stock-for-stock exchange require extensive disclo-
sure allowing the shareholder to make an informed decision whether to tender his shares or
hold them. See supra notes 94 & 96.
100. The person seeking control by the tender offer was not required to disclose his
identity, the sources of his funds, or his plans for the company. Unless incumbent manage-
ment publicly revealed this information, the shareholder would possess no information on
which to decide whether to tender his bids, hold them, or sell them on the market. Legisla-
tive History, supra note 93, at 2812.
101. As House Report No. 1711, the legislative history to the Williams Act, states:
[W]ithout knowledge of who the bidder is and what he plans to do, the shareholder
cannot reach an informed decision. He is forced to take a chance. For no matter what
he does, he does it without adequate information . . . . This is precisely the kind of
dilemma which our Federal securities laws are designed to prevent.
Id. at 2812-13.
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934102 to require disclosure by
both bidder and management and purported to maintain the bal-
ance of power between management and target while protecting
shareholders. 10 3
Section 13(d)10 4 of the Williams Act is the principal disclosure
provision. This section generally requires that any person who
through acquisition becomes the beneficial owner of more than five
percent of any class of equity securities in a corporation file a dis-
closure form within ten days of the acquisition. 10 5 The disclosure
must reveal the background of the owner, the source and amount
of funds used to make the purchases, and any plans or purposes of
the owner for the future of the target corporation. 106
The other major disclosure provision under the Williams Act
is Section 14.107 Section 14(d)(1) requires any person making a
tender offer which would result in that person becoming the bene-
ficial owner of more than five percent of the securities at the con-
summation of the tender offer to file a disclosure form with the
SEC.10 Section 14(d) also contains provisions for withdrawal
rights'0 9 and pro rata purchase." 0 According to Section 14(d)(5), a
security holder who tenders his securities may withdraw them at
any time prior to or during the first seven days of the offer and any
time after sixty days from the date of the original tender offer."'
Section 14(d)(6) states that a bidder who offers to buy less than
one hundred percent of the securities of a corporation must
purchase the percentage he desires on a pro rata basis from those
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
103. Legislative History, supra note 93, at 2813; see also Childers, The Federal
Scheme of Tender Offer Regulation, 7 J. CoRp. L. 525, 527 (1982).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
105. Id.; see also Childers, supra note 103, at 530. This disclosure must be filed with
the SEC, the issuer, and each exchange upon which the security is traded. Id. at 531.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A)-(C) (1982). The five-percent owner also must disclose
the number of shares beneficially owned, the number of shares that he has the right to
acquire either directly or indirectly, and information about any agreements concerning se-
curities of the issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(D)-(E) (1982).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982); see also Childers, supra note 103, at 534 (providing
a summary of this code section and its requirements).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982). This form must include all of the information re-
quired by Section 13(d)(1), including any "such additional information as the Commission
may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors." Id.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982). The SEC expanded the right to withdraw to encom-
pass the period during which the tender offer remains open. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a) (1987).
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who tendered their shares within the first ten days of the tender
offer.
112
Finally, the Williams Act contains a broad antifraud provi-
sion. ' Section 14(e) prohibits any material misstatements or
omissions and any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative prac-
tices." 4 The SEC has used its rule-making authority" 5 to promul-
gate regulations designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, or ma-
nipulative acts within the meaning of Section 14(e) of the Act."6
Regulation 14E states that a tender offer must remain open at
least twenty business days from the date of commencement. 1
Even though the purpose of the Williams Act originally was to
require the provision of information to shareholders during a
tender offer by means of disclosure provisions,"' one of the practi-
cal effects of the Act has been to facilitate and encourage compet-
ing bids and auctions." 9 Specific provisions facilitate auctions by
providing for withdrawal rights12 0 and a minimum number of days
during which tender offers must be kept open.' 2 ' For example, the
Act provides time for the shareholders of the target corporation to
recognize and evaluate the potential benefits from competing
bids.12 2 The Act also provides potential competing bidders the time
and information necessary to evaluate the target company and to
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982). The bidder must purchase a pro rata share of all
stock tendered. Id.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
114. Id.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982) provides: "The Commission shall, for the purposes of
this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to
prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."
116. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14e-1 to -3 (1987). These provisions are entitled Regulation 14E.
Id.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 240.14e-l(a) (1982). This Section states that "no person who makes a
tender offer shall: (a) Hold such offer open for less than twenty business days from the date
such tender offer is first published or sent or given to security holders." Id.
118. See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text.
119. Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1029 n.13, 1051-54; see also Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 10. Easterbrook and Fischel present a strong argument against allowing compet-
ing offers, but acknowledge this effect of the Williams Act. Id. at 1179 n.46; see also Jarrell
& Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers,
23 J.L. & EcoN. 371, 373 (1980) (stating that "[d]isclosure requirements and the delay of
execution caused by minimum offer periods. . . freely provide potential competing bidders
with time and information").
120. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1987). For an explanation of
these provisions see supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 to -2 (1987); see also supra notes 115-17 and accompanying
text.
122. Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1051-54.
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determine whether to compete in the auction. 2 ' The Pennzoil case
establishes that simple agreements between corporations that pre-
viously had been viewed as mere negotiations now may be held to
be binding contracts. The resulting uncertainty created by
Pennzoil has had a chilling effect on auctions and bidding wars'"
and undermined provisions of the Williams Act designed to facili-
tate competing bids and auctions.
b. A New Defensive Weapon
The uncertainty of the law regarding the "formal contract con-
templated" after the Pennzoil decision creates a new defensive
weapon. The Pennzoil jury decided that the parties became bound
by an agreement in principle prior to any written contract. There-
fore, target management may employ this concept defensively as a
form of lock-up.'25 Once a target and bidder reach an agreement in
principle to merge, the target's management can employ the lock-
up device to discourage other companies from offering competing
bids. 2 6 According to one source, the Pennzoil decision already has
been used to the detriment of shareholders by preventing competi-
123. Id.
124. As Peter Waldman wrote for the Wall Street Journal:
This "post-Texaco" climate of uncertainty is having a chilling effect on bidding compe-
tition. Some companies, accustomed to vicious bidding wars . . ., have grown gun-shy
in the wake of the Texaco verdict, especially when a potential target has entered any
type of agreement with a third party.
Wall Street, supra note 2, at 1, col. 1.
Texaco further argued that the judgment will "[deter] the initiation of contests for cor-
porate control across the country." Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 858 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987). In its brief to the Texas Court of Appeals, Texaco argued that the judgment
violates the Commerce Clause by chilling interstate tender offers. Texaco argued that if
Texaco can be subjected to liability on those facts, then no competing bidder could take the
risk of making a competing bid when an initial offeror previously has engaged in any negoti-
ations of substance with the target. Brief for Appellant, supra note 77, at 112-13. The Texas
Court of Appeals disagreed, stating:
This cause of action is for tortious interference with a contract. Judgment was not
rendered because Texaco won in a competitive tender offer situation. Rather, it was
rendered pursuant to the jury's finding that Texaco had tortiously interfered with a
binding agreement. A judgment based upon such a finding will not deter the "invita-
tion of contests for corporate control throughout the country"; however, it should deter
tortious interference with a binding agreement between parties.
Pennzoil, 729 S.W.2d at 859. The question, however, is not whether the third parties can
interfere with a binding contract, but whether a binding contract even exists.
125. Id. A lock-up is "[a]n arrangement made in connection with the proposed acquisi-
tion of a publicly held business, that gives the proposed acquiror an advantage in acquiring
the subject company over other potential acquirors." TENDER OFFERS: DEVELOPMENTS AND
COMMENTARIES 273-74 n.1 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985).
126. Wall Street, supra note 2, at 17, col. 1.
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tive bids during an actual acquisition. 127
Thus, use of the agreement in principle with a "formal con-
tract contemplated" can contravene the intent of Congress and the
SEC expressed in the Williams Act. While this contravention may
not rise to the level of criminal conduct, it does provide reason for
concern over the continued use of "formal contracts contemplated"
in the area of mergers and acquisitions. Congress and the SEC
have fashioned a policy of facilitating competing bids, but the use
of these agreements can stifle competing bids by effectively locking
up the target company.
c. Impact on Shareholders and Society at Large
The chilling impact that agreements in principle have had on
competing offers has elicited approval from some experts and dis-
dain from others.12 8 Some commentators believe that competing
bids should be facilitated as much as possible. 129  Lucien
Bebchuk,1"3 0 for example, believes that competing tender offers are
desirable because they benefit both the target's shareholders and
the general society. 13' Bebchuk advocates a rule for auctioneering
that would, through regulation of offers under the Williams Act
and state statutes, provide sufficient time for competitors to sub-
mit bids. 32 This rule also would allow the target's incumbent man-
agement to solicit competing bids by providing information about
the target corporation to any potential buyer.13 3
Bebchuk discusses four motives to explain why offerors initi-
127. The Wall Street Journal reported that in negotiations between Texas Air and
Eastern Airlines, Pennzoil "was used as a negotiating tool to stop the bidding process...
and it was used to the detriment of the shareholders." Id. (quoting an unidentified Braniff
Airline official). Texas Air and Eastern Airlines agreed on an acquisition price, and, at a
news conference two days later, Eastern President Frank Borman dismissed the possibility
of a competing bid, saying, "You probably have heard of Texaco and Pennzoil." This state-
ment reportedly played a part in preventing two competing bids. Id.
128. See, e.g., Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply,
35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Bebchuk, supra note 10; Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice
and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1695 (1985); Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 99; Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender
Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982).
129. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1030; see also Gilson, supra note 128, at 51-
52.
130. Bebchuk is a member of the Society of Fellows, Harvard University.
131. Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1030. Gilson believes that competing bids will in-
crease allocative efficiency and may increase return on investment in the search for target
companies. Gilson, supra note 128, at 66.
132. Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1030, 1051-54.
133. Id. at 1030, 1054-56.
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ate takeover bids. 13' First, the bidder may decide that the target's
management operates inefficiently and that new management
could increase profits and decrease costs. 135 Second, combining the
operations may increase profits through economies of scale.13
Third, the offeror may believe that, for whatever reason, the tar-
get's stock is undervalued. 137 Finally, the offeror may be motivated
by a kind of managerial entrepreneurship,'13 a belief that manage-
ment's income, prestige, and perquisites tend to increase in pro-
portion to the firm's size.139
Bebchuk also claims that allowing auctions will benefit the
target's shareholders .by increasing the premiums paid on their
shares of stock. 40 Typically, target shareholders are dispersed and
cannot bargain readily with the initial offeror's takeover bid. The
shareholders must either tender their shares at the offered price or
hold on to their shares. Whatever a shareholder decides, the choice
will not affect the other shareholders, and no bargaining over the
bid will take place.' Only competing offers will force the offered
price to rise and allow the shareholders to obtain a better share of
134. Id. at 1030. The management of a corporation often will begin to shirk responsi-
bilities and not perform at peak efficiency because much of the benefit of their work inures
to others, namely shareholders or other managers. Because managers often feel like a small
cog in a big wheel, they may become less efficient. Prospective bidders become aware of this
decrease in efficiency and decide to remedy the problem. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
10, at 1169-73.
135. Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1030-31. This motive was suggested first by Manne,
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110, 113 (1965).
136. Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1031-32. The acquiror may possess some skills that
will be useful to the target. The takeover also may yield tax savings or an increase in com-
bined market power. Id.; see also P. STEINER, MERGERS: MOTIVES, EFFECTS, POLICIES 75-95
(1975).
137. Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1032-33.
138. Id. at 1033; see, e.g., R. MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF 'MANAGERIAL' CAPITAL-
ISm 122-24 (1964).
139. Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1033.
140. Id. at 1038-41. Professor Bebchuk agrees that auctions are not detrimental to the
initial offeror because the rewards for the search are high relative to the risks. Id. at 1034-
38. Professor Gilson argues that competitive bidding can increase benefits to the initial of-
feror by allowing those persons who spent the money gathering information about the target
to "sell" the information to a subsequent bidder. The initial bidder gathers the information
and purchases the maximum amount of stock in a company possible without having to make
a public disclosure, then releases the information. This information may alert a company
who desires to bid, causing the price to rise and benefitting the initial information gatherer.
Gilson, supra note 128, at 52-56.
141. Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1038-40. Shareholders who own large volumes of stock
often take into account the effect of their decisions on the success of the tender offer, poten-
tially strengthening the bargaining ability of the target shareholders. However, as long as
the majority of the stock is owned by small shareholders, the bargaining ability of any indi-
vidual shareholder remains very limited. Id. at 1040.
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the gains that the bidder expects to realize from the takeover.142
Bebchuk states that auctions also provide substantial benefits
to society143 by (1) increasing the likelihood of the target being ac-
quired by the firm to which its assets are most valuable; 4 4 (2) en-
couraging socially desirable investment in potential targets; 45 (3)
encouraging the management of potential targets to look for an ap-
propriate acquiror; 1 6 and (4) increasing available information in
order to minimize the potential for bad acquisitions that yield
losses or, at best, no gains.
147
If Bebchuk's view that auctions are valuable to society is cor-
rect,148 the implications of using the "formal contract contem-
plated" in mergers and acquisitions are apparent. Because the
Pennzoil case may cause merger and takeover specialists to react
to these types of agreements defensively, decreasing the number of
competitive bids,149 target shareholders and society both may suf-
fer injury. Such a decrease in competitive bids that would injure
target shareholders and society as a whole supports the call for re-
form in the use of the "formal contract contemplated" in mergers
and acquisitions.
Some commentators, however, believe that competing tender
offers should be discouraged. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fis-
chel,150 for example, argue that the management of tender offer
targets should not seek competing offers to increase the wealth of
shareholders.151 Instead of encouraging competing bids that ulti-
142. Auctions also may increase the premiums for a target's shareholders in negotiated
acquisitions. The target's management will use the threat of soliciting competing bids to
negotiate a higher purchase price. Id. at 1041-46.
143. Id. at 1046-50.
144. Id. at 1048; see also Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 872-74 (1981) (stating
that "[a]s a general principle, allocating resources among competing claimants by price is
desirable because it places resources with the most efficient users"). This allocation benefits
the acquiring company because of increases in post-offer prices of the acquiror's stock. Id. at
873.
145. Bebchuk, supra note 10, at 1049.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1049-50.
148. Other commentators also assert that auctions should be encouraged. See, e.g.,
Gilson, supra note 128, at 51.
149. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
150. At the time they wrote the article, Frank Easterbrook was an Assistant Professor
of Law at the University of Chicago and Daniel Fischel was an Assistant Professor of Law at
Northwestern University. Easterbrook is currently a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Fischel is presently the Director of the Law and Economics
Program at the University of Chicago.
151. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 1161; Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 119.
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mately may result in no change in management, hostile takeovers
are a means of correcting inefficiencies in the management of the
corporation, which increases the wealth of society as a whole.152
Easterbrook and Fischel further argue that the encouragement
of competition actually decreases the total number of tender of-
fers. 153 The first offeror may expend considerable time, money, and
effort researching firms that are likely candidates for a takeover.
154
When the offeror announces its bid, potential competing firms may
learn that the target company is ripe for a takeover.1 55 The com-
peting bidder acquires this information at a substantially lower
cost than the initial bidder1 58 and thus may be able to pay a higher
price per share while making an equal or greater profit.15 7 As a re-
sult, fewer firms are willing to be the first bidder. The number of
tender offers therefore decreases, and the management of target
firms has less incentive to operate efficiently.15 8
If the thesis of Easterbrook and Fischel concerning the effect
of competing offers is correct, then the use of agreements in princi-
Professors Jarrell and Bradley argue that the Williams Act and state regulations requiring
disclosure and waiting periods provide time and information to potential competing bidders
during a tender offer. Id. at 373. While this bidding does lead to higher premiums for
targets' shareholders, the overall effect is to increase social costs and to decrease the number
of tender offers. Id.
152. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 1168-74. Other commentators have
agreed, stating that "corporate takeovers are beneficial exchanges of corporate control that
generally result in more efficient management of target resources." Jarrell & Bradley, supra
note 119, at 380.
153. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 1178; see also Jarrell & Bradley, supra
note 119, at 373-74.
154. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 1178.
155. Id. Thus, both the bid itself and the substantial amount of disclosure required by
the Williams Act, see supra notes 91-117 and accompanying text, provide information about
the target to the bidder. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 1178; see also Jarrell &
Bradley, supra note 119, at 373 (noting that "ld]isclosure requirements and the delay of
execution caused by minimum offer periods and legal actions freely provide potential com-
peting bidders with time and information"). The mere existence of the offer notifies other
firms of potential takeover targets. Such modification allows competing firms to avoid the
high costs of searching for a prospective takeover, costs the first offeror cannot avoid. Eas-
terbrook & Fischel, supra, at 1178 n.45.
156. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 1178-79. Such disclosure of information
means that bidding will occur and that winning bidders will be forced to pay higher premi-
ums in order to win the battle. This increase in the premium over that which would have
been the premium had there been no auction imposes a "tax" on the acquisition of informa-
tion. This "tax" reduces the production of knowledge and deters some otherwise profitable
takeovers. Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 119, at 386.
157. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 10, at 1178-79.
158. Id.; see also Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 119, at 404 (concluding that "some
otherwise profitable takeovers are deterred, and all takeovers occurring after regulation pro-
duce relatively smaller social gains").
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ple after Pennzoil should not reduce the overall number of tender
offers. These two commentators argue that discouraging competing
bids actually has a favorable impact on the environment for tender
offers. However, even Easterbrook and Fischel, and others who
ascribe to their thesis, should be concerned about the cloud of un-
certainty that Pennzoil has cast over the mergers and acquisitions
marketplace. The best way to facilitate tender offers, which Eas-
terbrook and Fischel agree are beneficial to society, is to ensure
that negotiations are as accurate and certain as possible.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. The Contract to Bargain
While the cumulative effects of agreements in principle with a
"formal contract contemplated" have yet to be fully realized, the
magnitude of the problems already identified justifies a search for
possible solutions. One possible solution to the ambiguity caused
by the use of the "formal contract contemplated" has been sug-
gested by Charles L. Knapp. 59 The parties' intentions and expec-
tations during negotiations often become frustrated by the law re-
garding the "formal contract contemplated" because the common
law characterizes all dealings as either contract or no contract and
ignores other possible intentions. 60 Even without legal redress for
breach of contract, the parties to negotiations often consider them-
selves to some extent morally or ethically bound. 161 Knapp, there-
fore, proposes that courts create a legally recognized "contract to
bargain"16 2 to be used by parties who, through negotiations, have
159. Knapp, supra note 3, at 673.
160. Id. at 678. Knapp discusses the ambiguities and problems associated with the use
of the "formal contract contemplated," stating:
It is suggested that in a number of cases, the. .. "written contract contemplated" rule
...run[s] . . . counter to the intentions and expectations of the parties at the time of
the transaction under scrutiny. This is because the common law's dichotomy of con-
tract/no-contract does not exhaust the catalog of possible intentions.
Id.
161. Id. at 679. The parties have agreed on as many terms as they can and leave it to
attorneys to put this agreement in writing and add the necessary legalities. The parties may
feel bound ethically to the broad outline of the agreement. If a substantial issue cannot be
resolved, however, the parties may feel perfectly free to withdraw. Id. at 684.
162. Id. at 685. By using the word "contract" in the phrase "contract to bargain,"
Knapp stresses that the relationship between the parties entails some binding obligations,
the breach of which may result in liability. The word "bargain" emphasizes that the parties
are not absolutely required to perform or even to agree to perform; the contract to bargain
creates a duty to bargain in good faith to reach agreement within a reasonable time. Id.
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settled many but not all of the terms of a contract, but neverthe-
less feel committed to the entire proposed agreement. 163 In the
"contract to bargain" each party agrees to negotiate in good faith
to reach a final contract. If, however, agreement cannot be reached
despite good faith efforts by the parties, either party may with-
draw without liability."'
Under Knapp's contract to bargain, the intent necessary to
create an agreement is present when the parties have agreed on the
essential terms of the bargain and become committed to an overall
plan.'6 5 The parties' intent is determined by looking to the writings
of the parties and all of the surrounding circumstances.166 The bur-
den of proving willingness to be bound rests with the proponent of
the contract to bargain.'6"
'Conduct constituting bad faith establishes a breach of the con-
tract to bargain. 68 The most obvious example of bad faith occurs
when a party withdraws simply because a third party has made a
better offer.'69 Courts probably will enforce the contract to bargain
only when one party has unilaterally withdrawn from negotiations
or insisted on terms so unreasonable that acceptance could not be
expected, coupled with a demonstrable advantage to be gained by
the defendant in avoiding the contemplated transaction."70 Knapp
does not delineate the specific remedies that a court may award for
breach of a contract to bargain. ' He suggests, however, that a
successful plaintiff should recover at least reliance damages and
163. Id. Parties generally consider withdrawal unjustified for any reason except failure
to agree on the remaining points. Id.
164. Id. at 685-86.
165. Id. at 720-28.
166. Id. at 720.
167. Id. at 720-21. This burden of proof should be no greater than for any other con-
tract, and the court should allow the proponent to rely on both oral manifestations of intent
and any written memoranda, such as a memorandum of agreement. Id. at 720-21.
168. Id. at 721-23.
169. Id. at 721. Professor Knapp cautions that the good faith requirement may be
objected to for two reasons:
[It] may be used to penalize a party for "insufficient bargaining". .. [and] ... when-
ever an extraneous factor ... makes withdrawal from the contract materially advanta-
geous to one party, that party runs the risk of being held liable even if he withdraws
from the transaction only after extensive bargaining has failed to produce a complete
agreement.
Id. at 722.
170. Id. at 722-23.
171. Id. Knapp refers to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1965) (providing that remedies in promissory estoppel may be limited as justice requires).
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possibly expectation damages or specific performance. 172
Knapp's concept of the contract to bargain reflects the parties'
actual beliefs concerning the degree that they intend to be bound
in the contractual relationship. 17 3 In the area of mergers and acqui-
sitions, however, proving the parties' intent to be bound by a con-
tract to bargain is as difficult as in the area of the "formal contract
contemplated." Many of the same factual questions arise in both
situations. Perhaps the difference is that a lesser showing of intent
is needed in the contract to bargain in which the proponent must
show only that both parties have agreed on certain essential terms
and intend to work in good faith toward a contract.1 74 In contrast,
the proponent in a "formal contract contemplated" case must show
that the parties intended to be bound on all terms prior to the
execution of a formal contract.17 5 The question of intent remains
difficult to solve and provides no clear-cut, bright-line rule for
guidance.
Several issues arise concerning the requirement of good faith
in fhe contract to bargain. Knapp states that the clearest example
of bad faith is acceptance of a better offer from a third party. In
the area of mergers and acquisitions, acceptance of a competing
bid after reaching a contract to bargain would constitute bad faith
and result in liability. Thus, in order to avoid charges of bad faith,
a party should not accept a competing bid until after he formally
withdraws in good faith from the first set of negotiations.
B. The Bright-Line Approach
Perhaps a better method of avoiding the problems created by
Pennzoil is the bright-line approach. In the concurring opinion to
International Telemeter Corp. v. Teleprompter Corp.,76 Judge
Friendly emphasized the gap between contract law and the reality
of complex business transactions. 177 He then .stated a rule to the
effect that no contract exists in complex business agreements until
the signing and completion of a contract.17 8 Until this formal exe-
172. Knapp, supra note 3, at 723-26. Damages, of course, must be proven with reason-
able certainty. The plaintiff also must demonstrate proximate cause and foreseeability. Id.
at 723 & n.172.
173. Knapp provides numerous situations in which the contract to bargain would have
been feasible by applying it to actual cases. Id. at 698-719.
174. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
176. 592 F.2d 49, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 57.
178. Judge Friendly said that "under a view conforming to the realities of business
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cution, the parties remain free to negotiate over new issues of form
or substance or to withdraw altogether.
179
Judge Friendly's bright-line rule would eliminate the uncer-
tainties generated by the current law concerning the "formal con-
tract contemplated." In negotiations toward a merger or acquisi-
tion, no legally binding agreement would exist until the negotiating
parties agreed on all of the terms and signed a formal contract. As
a result, negotiating parties could avoid the kind of complex, vex-
ing, and costly litigation that recently has arisen because of the
uncertainty generated by the law on "formal contracts contem-
plated." This rule also would allay fears that tend to decrease the
number of competing bids because firms that wish to offer a com-
peting bid would know exactly when the original parties are bound.
The problem with the bright-line rule is that it has not yet
been recognized or accepted by any court.8 0 The rules governing
when parties become legally bound absent a formally executed
document have existed for well over one hundred years.' 8 ' How-
ever, a bright-line rule seems simple to apply and would provide
clear guidance to the parties in a merger or acquisition. Because of
the complexity and vast amounts of money typically involved in a
merger or acquisition, the rule would also reflect the intent of most
parties not be bound prior to the execution of a formal, written
merger agreement.
C. The Cautious Approach
Because the bright-line approach has not been adopted by any
court of law, the parties engaged in negotiating a merger or acqui-
sition should take steps during their negotiations to express clearly
and unequivocally the intent of the parties not to be bound prior
to the definitive merger agreement. First, the parties wishing not
to be bound before a formal execution should include a statement
life, there would be no contract in [complex business agreements] until the document is
signed and delivered; until then either party would be free to bring up new points of form or
substance, or even to withdraw altogether." Id. at 57-58.
179. Id. at 58. Judge Friendly stated that most parties in complex business transac-
tions do not intend to be bound prior to the signing of the formal contract; the formal
document is viewed as the contract and not just a written memorial of a previously reached
oral agreement. Id.
180. Id. Judge Friendly states that neither New York courts nor the Restatement has
gone this far and was unable to find a "fair basis for predicting that the New York Court of
Appeals is yet prepared to do so." Id.
181. See, e.g., Mississippi & Dominion S.S. Co. v. Swift, 86 Me. 248, 29 A. 1063 (1894).
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to this effect in all writings between the negotiating parties.182 The
statement should provide that the parties do not intend to be
bound prior to the execution of a definitive merger agreement, re-
gardless of any oral agreements or preliminary documents. Negoti-
ating parties should incorporate this statement in all preliminary
documents or correspondence. 183 Second, the parties involved
should exercise caution at all times. Once the boards of directors of
the corporations approve the terms of the negotiations, the boards
should adopt a resolution stating that this approval is given sub-
ject to the execution of a definitive merger agreement.' The par-
ties to the negotiations should further provide that certain negotia-
tors, such as investment bankers, have no power to form binding
agreements.' 8 In addition, the parties should advise all partici-
pants involved in negotiations to use extreme caution when taking
notes during negotiations. Notes stating that the parties have
reached an agreement often are misleading.'8 8 Therefore, all of the
parties' writings should be examined carefully to ensure that noth-
ing can be interpreted as a binding contract.'87
Given the existing law in this area, parties to a merger never
can be entirely sure that they will not be bound prior to the sign-
ing of a written contract. Thus, these suggested preliminary pre-
cautions are not guaranteed remedies,'88 but they may assist nego-
tiating parties in avoiding problems like those encountered in the
Pennzoil dispute. Also, by observing that the original parties have
182. DiBlasi & Cyganowski, supra note 2, at 24, col. 1.
183. Id. These documents include offers to purchase or sell, correspondence confirm-
ing an agreement, draft agreements, and press releases. Id. Because a letter of intent often
outlines all or most of the major points of agreement between the parties, one could miscon-
strue such a letter as a binding contract. Thus, the drafters should include disclaimers stat-
ing that neither party intends to be bound by the letter. I BUSINEss ACQUISITIONS, supra
note 72, §§ 4.103b, 4.103d-4.106b.
184. DiBlasi & Cyganowski, supra note 2, at 24. Such a resolution is particularly im-




188. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Pennzoil's and Getty's press release
stated that the agreement was subject to execution of a definitive merger agreement. DiBlasi
and Cyganowski write:
Given the general nature of these rules and the wide variety of circumstances relating
to mergers and acquisitions in which they may be applied, it is not surprising that their
application may not yield uniform results. Nonetheless, there are certain steps that
participants. . . can take to reduce the risk that they will be unintentionally and pre-
maturely bound to an informal agreement.
DiBlasi & Cyganowski, supra note 2, at 24.
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taken these proposed steps, bidders could be more confident in
making a competing bid that no liability will attach for tortious
interference with a contract.
V. CONCLUSION
The rules of contract law regarding the formal contract con-
templated are imprecise and uncertain. The use of agreements in
principle may lead to damaging court battles in mergers and acqui-
sitions. Pennzoil has demonstrated at least that much.' 89 The cu-
mulative effects of Pennzoil probably have not been realized. They
may in fact be negligible, but the tremendous difficulty that has
resulted from this single case demonstrates the need to create an
alternative to agreements in principle. A bright-line rule seems to
be the best method to avoid the problem. This approach would
remove much of the uncertainty in "formal contracts contem-
plated" and would help companies to avoid expensive, time-con-
suming litigation. The contract to bargain, the antithesis of the
bright-line approach, is generally unsuited for use in mergers and
acquisitions and would not be as precise as the bright-line method.
Because no state has yet adopted a bright-line rule, corporate at-
torneys should exercise extreme caution at all stages of the negoti-
ation process to ensure that agreement cannot be inferred when
not intended. These suggested steps may provide a simple and
straightforward method of avoiding the catastrophic problems that
Texaco encountered in Pennzoil.
CHRISTOPHER M. GOFFINET
189. Although the Texas Court of Appeals reduced the punitive damage award from
$3 billion to $1 billion, damages still stand at $8.53 billion, plus interest. Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The Court of Appeals stated that many
amicus curiae briefs suggested that the verdict be reduced or overturned "because of the
adverse economic impact it would have . . . on certain states and industries, and on Tex-
aco's many shareholders." Id. at 865. The court, however, stated that the evidence sup-
ported the damage award and that, therefore, the court could not overturn it. Id. Texaco
filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-74 (1987), on April 12, 1987, "in order to forestall enforcement of a $10.53 billion
judgment against it awarded to Pennzoil by a Texas court in December 1985." Texaco and
Pennzoil Lock Horns Again: Fight Erupts on Bid to Drop Chapter 11 Panel, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 5, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
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